Can Joe Biden build back the crumbling US-Saudi alliance?

The signs that America is no longer the sole outside player in Saudi Arabia are clear and many.

Chinese-made cars zip along Jeddah’s tony waterfront.

Dozens of Chinese businesses that have set up shop in Riyadh eye contracts for Saudi megaprojects.

Since last Fall, all schools in the kingdom, from primary to graduate, offer Chinese as an optional “third language” after Arabic and English; a few private universities teach Mandarin as the second language after Arabic.

And the majority of Saudi crude oil loaded onto tankers is heading for the South China Sea.

Even as President Joe Biden visits Saudi Arabia this week to shore up an 80-year alliance with a country he once termed a “pariah,” Beijing and others have been moving in to help influence the kingdom’s post-oil future.

With the president seeking to strengthen America globally against both Russia and China, U.S. and Saudi officials face the challenging task of reviving a relationship in which both partners have different needs – and different views on what makes a good ally.

The only question looming larger than how far Saudi Arabia can truly enter Beijing’s orbit, is whether the long-time allies can provide what the other needs.

The answer, some say, may lie with honestly articulating what those needs are.

What is U.S. policy now?

Mr. Biden’s visit to Jeddah on Friday, scheduled to include bilateral meetings with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as well as a summit with other Arab leaders, follows his two-day visit to Israel to reassure another key regional ally.

It comes at what American and Saudi officials describe as “a low point” for their long partnership.

There is the well-documented friction between the leaders over the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

There is rising anti-Saudi sentiment in Congress over the kingdom’s human rights record, and frustration among Saudis over American unwillingness to support their economic transformation.

And U.S. officials were “deeply disappointed” with Saudi Arabia’s refusal to boost oil output following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, though doing so would have ripped up a hard-won production agreement between OPEC nations and Russia that ended a punishing price war.

American officials described the Saudis’ February push-back as a “wake-up call” in Washington.

But all agree Mr. Biden’s greatest task is confronting the fact that the strained U.S.-Saudi ties predate the Ukraine war, Mr. Khashoggi’s murder, or the crown prince’s rise.

It is the core question that every Arab official, and politically attuned citizen, asks: What, now, is America’s foreign policy in the Middle East?

“The strategic relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. is important because it supports a certain peace in the region,” says Saudi analyst Mohammed Alyahya, a fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “But there is confusion as to what exactly America is guaranteeing when it says it is pivoting away from the region.”

In a relationship built on energy security in return for regional military security, the Saudi leadership sees a United States not as fully committed as it once was.  

Saudi officials say Washington has been changing its priorities for more than a decade and acts now as if it does not know what it wants from its Gulf alliance – or if it wants it at all.

They point to apparent support for Arab Spring democratic uprisings; reneging on its chemical-weapons red line in Syria; repeated declarations that America is “pivoting” to Asia; and the perceived overlooking of Iran’s destabilizing activities in a race to secure a nuclear deal. 

“People in the Gulf don’t know what to take seriously in U.S. policy statements,” says Mr. Alyahya, who describes Gulf states as undergoing a political and economic “diversification” of partners in the past decade.  

The presence of Russian and Chinese firms and flurry of government delegations to Riyadh underscores a belief here that it is the U.S. that deserted Saudi Arabia, forcing it to rely more on Beijing and Moscow.

“From our standpoint, the Americans are the ones that allowed Russia to come to our door-step and set up bases in the heart of the Arab world,” says a Saudi official not authorized to speak to the press. “They pivoted away from us. Now they expect us to turn things around in a second?”

Amr Nabil/AP

Saudi special forces salute in front of a screen displaying images of Saudi King Salman, right, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after a military parade in preparation for the annual Hajj pilgrimage, in the holy city of Mecca, July 3, 2022. President Joe Biden is scheduled to meet with both leaders in Jeddah on Friday as he seeks to repair the U.S. alliance with the kingdom.

Generation China?

More than a realpolitik realignment, the Saudi drift closer to China’s orbit is also being driven by young Saudis who perceive greater opportunities with a China on the rise.

Increasingly, young Saudis are pursuing higher education in China to make inroads in the country before embarking on their own businesses. And this after the kingdom sent 250,000 young Saudis to study at U.S. universities on scholarships over the past decade.

“For technology and business, China is leading the future,” says Mohamed, an IT engineer who only gave his first name. He graduated with a computer science degree from Zhejiang University and now works for a health-tech start-up in Riyadh. “China is a good place to study and improve oneself for the global market," he says.

Some Saudis make little distinction between American criticism of Crown Prince Mohammed and a general anti-Saudi sentiment, with attempts to “cancel” Western companies and even performers who come to Saudi Arabia.

Young Saudis told The Monitor that despite being personally drawn to America, they are more willing to align themselves economically and politically with China, which, despite its mass incarceration of Muslim Uyghurs, appears more welcoming.

“Regardless of who is responsible, it is unfortunate that the U.S. is losing the source of soft power it has in Saudi Arabia,” says Mr. Alyahya.

“By boycotting an entire country, or making its citizens feel that they don’t deserve” to see performances by Western musicians or professional golfers, “it unnecessarily bullies people and inspires these fantastical and unrealistic views that China is the answer.”

But observers say there are limits to how far the kingdom can gravitate toward Beijing.

Saudi officials and businesspeople describe an “ease of business” and cultural understanding with Americans that they struggle to find with Chinese firms and officials.

“There is a clash of business cultures between the Chinese and the Saudis while there is a sense of familiarity with Americans,” says Chris Johnson, ex-officio of the American Chamber of Commerce, Saudi Arabia, who has represented both Western and Chinese firms in the kingdom.

“There is a certain warmth and friendship that is important for Saudis that just isn’t the way the Chinese do business.”

With Saudi Arabia’s effort to transition to a post-oil economy, thousands of young Saudis are eager to emulate Silicon Valley, not Shanghai.

From leafy suburbs sprouting up around Riyadh and Mecca to coworking spaces with bean bag chairs and foosball, Saudi Arabian culture is turning decidedly more American, not less, under the crown prince.

Acknowledging the relationship

The first step to mending ties, Saudi observers say, is for Washington to publicly admit it needs and values their partnership.

“Biden should focus on American interests and world stability, not play to the pressures of the radical left agenda,” says Mohammed Alhamed, president of Saudi Elite Group, a youth empowerment organization, and an analyst of Saudi-U.S. relations. “There needs to be an acknowledgement of the importance of this relationship, and that Saudi Arabia has become an important player in the world stage.”

Mr. Biden started this “acknowledgement” in an op-ed last weekend in the Washington Post – the late Mr. Khashoggi’s employer and a publication that has rankled Saudi officials.

“We have to counter Russia’s aggression, put ourselves in the best possible position to outcompete China, and work for greater stability in a consequential region of the world,” the president wrote.

“To do these things, we have to engage directly with countries that can impact those outcomes. Saudi Arabia is one of them,” he stated, pledging to “reorient – but not rupture – relations with a country that’s been a strategic partner for 80 years.”

Officials and observers say Saudi Arabia is looking for a “concrete commitment” to regional security. But as Iran nears a nuclear weapon, what can America offer its allies?

Mr. Biden provided one answer in Jerusalem Thursday in a joint declaration he signed with Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid: “The United States stresses … the commitment never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, and that it is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure the outcome.”

The declaration notably included the strongest U.S. language yet against Iran’s proxy activities in the region, a top concern for Saudi Arabia, vowing “to confront Iran’s aggression and destabilizing activities.”

No firm steps were announced to implement this pledge.

David Rundell, a former U.S. diplomat and author on Saudi Arabia, acknowledges a domestic U.S. political discomfort with “a greater U.S. commitment to a country whose leader is depicted as a despot.”

But he says, bluntly: “If you want to avoid a nuclear disaster in the region, the U.S. needs to promote a more open and concrete security alliance with Saudi Arabia.”

Many say even a modest boost in Saudi oil production and an agreement on shared challenges could mark the Biden visit to the kingdom as a success.

“The visit itself is a recognition of the importance of the relationship and is a step in the right direction,” says Mr. Rundell. “That is significant and should not be underestimated.”