What is Russia’s ‘shadow fleet,’ and why does it worry Europe?
| Basel, Switzerland
The phrase “Russian shadow fleet” conjures images of stealthy, high-tech ships cruising Western shorelines undetected.
The reality is decidedly less cinematic.
The vessels in question are not modern, but rather are primarily aging fuel tankers. Many are not even Russian ships. But they are still raising alarms across Europe.
Why We Wrote This
Russia has deployed a “shadow fleet” of oil tankers that is worrying European nations. It’s not just about sanctions, which the vessels circumvent: They also pose environmental and navigational risks, particularly in the Baltic Sea.
Russia has adapted to Western measures to limit its economic and military capacities to wage war on Ukraine, by buying ships, rerouting oil exports from Europe to Asia, and building new markets in Africa and Latin America.
The fleet has become the linchpin of Russia’s oil exports – with some estimates suggesting that its run-down vessels ship over 80% of Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports. And its efforts to avoid Western sanction enforcement are raising environmental and navigational risks in crowded seaways.
Moreover, the shadow vessels are linked to a series of suspected sabotage incidents damaging energy and communication infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.
Russia’s non-Russian fleet
There is no universally agreed-on definition of the shadow fleet, which is also known as the dark fleet or gray fleet. Other countries under sanctions – Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela – have previously employed clandestine shipping networks to circumvent international scrutiny and sanctions.
Russia’s use of the shadow fleet is of a different magnitude since the onset of Western sanctions, however. Many experts use the term to refer to vessels that are owned, managed, or insured by entities outside the sanctions coalition – and, thus, do not fall under the oil price cap.
The typical Russian shadow tanker is owned by a special purpose vehicle, for instance in the Marshall Islands; sails under a flag of convenience such as that of Panama or Liberia; and is managed by a company based in the United Arab Emirates.
And despite the fleet’s name, most of these tankers have no overt connection to Russia, says Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the Kyiv School of Economics. “There is little explicitly Russian about the vessels except the oil on them.”
Mr. Hilgenstock says about 650 shadow tankers have carried Russian oil since the start of the war in Ukraine, with about 200 leaving Russian ports every month. He estimates that in 2024 alone, their transport of crude oil alone generated around $10 billion in extra earnings for Russia.
“As long as there are buyers of Russian crude oil, they will, of course, sell it, and that will result in revenue for the Russian war machine,” says Mariliis Sepp of the sanctions and strategic export control department of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
EU sanctions mean that vessels carrying Russian crude oil or selling over the price cap of $60 per barrel are not allowed into European ports. However, those ships do benefit from the right to innocent passage, a principle of international law that allows foreign vessels to navigate through the territorial waters of a coastal state, provided they do not pose a threat.
What alarms Baltic and North Sea states is the threat the shadow fleet poses in terms of environmental and maritime security. Its vessels engage in a series of tactics to camouflage their activities, including blacking out their identification systems and falsifying their positions.
“They are a threat because when you jam GPS signals or spoof your vessels, that is a direct risk to other vessels in that area,” notes Ms. Sepp.
Crowded sea lanes
Estonia finds itself on the front lines of maritime security concerns due to its geographical proximity to Russia on the Gulf of Finland in the easternmost part of the Baltic Sea. Cargo ships and oil tankers in the gulf mostly sail east-west to get cargo from Russia’s key ports like Primorsk, the largest oil-loading port in the Baltic Sea. On the other hand, the gulf’s intra-EU passenger traffic – about 10 million people annually – is north-southward, creating opportunities for collision.
The presence of vessels parked in Estonia’s external economic zone, typically waiting to enter Russian ports, raises alarms about potential environmental damage in the event of an oil spill. Some ships wait around for days, others for months. Last summer, Estonia asked 200 vessels parked there, on a voluntary basis, for proof of insurance. Two-thirds responded.
“They pose a threat to our environment as they are very close to the coast, and even if they have insurance, it might not be very reliable,” says Ms. Sepp. “We are seeing some new insurance companies popping up [in new countries]. Previously, 90% of the vessels were carrying Western insurance. Now that has, of course, fallen.”
India, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are among the homes of the insurance newcomers, she notes. The vessels are not always owned by Russia; many are rented, adds Ms. Sepp. “This has been surprising for us.”
Seagoing saboteurs?
Another area of concern is undersea infrastructure damaged by these vessels in apparent acts of sabotage. The NATO Baltic Sea countries met Jan. 14 to discuss measures to address that threat. NATO decided to deploy frigates, patrol aircraft, and naval drones to help safeguard critical infrastructure as part of the “Baltic Sentry” initiative.
“NATO will work on innovative solutions in technology and tracking in cooperation with the private sector,” says Pia Sarivaara, sanctions coordinator for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Experts are also examining what else can be done within the bounds of international maritime law.
Multiple incidents have made the Russian shadow fleet the subject of regional headlines.
In late December, the Russia-linked oil tanker Eagle S was reportedly linked to damage to submarine cables between Estonia and Finland. According to Finnish police, the tanker slowed and dragged its anchor around the cable around midday. Another three cables were damaged. Finnish authorities boarded and seized the Eagle S after getting visual confirmation that the vessel’s anchor was not in place.
In January, Swedish authorities seized a Malta-flagged tanker that damaged an undersea cable between Sweden and Latvia. A second vessel, suspected of involvement in the same incident, was detained by Norway Jan. 31. The repeat nature of the incidents makes authorities suspect sabotage.
But some cases appear to be just accidents. A Malta-flagged tanker that damaged an undersea cable Jan. 26 between Sweden and Latvia was released this month after Swedish prosecutors ruled out sabotage. A second vessel with a Russian crew, suspected of involvement in the same incident, was detained by Norway Jan. 31, but also released.
