Trump promises a quick end to the war in Ukraine. Russia is not convinced.
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Fred Weir Special correspondent
| Moscow
Incoming President Donald Trump says he will make ending the war in Ukraine a top priority in his administration, and that it will end quickly.
But the Russians are clearly signaling that they find the jumbled ideas they hear coming out of the Trump camp, at least so far, to be mostly nonstarters.
Why We Wrote This
Many assume that because Donald Trump has an affinity for Vladimir Putin, his policies mirror those of the Russian president. In the case of ending the war in Ukraine, at least, there is a yawning gulf between the two men’s outlooks.
Moscow and Washington disagree sharply on the war’s causes, the shape of a possible compromise settlement and, especially, what kind of independent Ukrainian state – if any – might emerge from a deal.
Territory is not Moscow’s primary concern, Russian analysts say, but rather it is the orientation of the Ukrainian state that emerges from any settlement. “Russia accepts the existence of a sovereign, independent Ukraine,” says Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser. “We oppose a Ukraine that’s an anti-Russia Western client state.”
In addition to neutrality, Russian analysts argue, Ukraine will need to accept effective demilitarization and acquiesce to being part of a Russian sphere of influence. That is probably the biggest sticking point for the incoming Trump administration.
While Mr. Trump has conceded that Ukraine may have to sacrifice territory, he does seem to agree with the idea of “armed neutrality” for a Ukraine that would be otherwise aligned with the West.
Incoming President Donald Trump says he will make ending the war in Ukraine a top priority in his administration, and that it will end quickly.
Many Western experts cast doubt on his assessment. But there’s another, perhaps more surprising party who disagrees: Russia itself.
The Russians are clearly signaling that they find the jumbled ideas they hear coming out of the Trump camp, at least so far, to be mostly nonstarters. And while Mr. Trump, as his inauguration approaches, has revised his timeline for a settlement from “24 hours” to as much as six months, that doesn’t address the yawning gulf between Moscow and Washington over how they understand the war.
Why We Wrote This
Many assume that because Donald Trump has an affinity for Vladimir Putin, his policies mirror those of the Russian president. In the case of ending the war in Ukraine, at least, there is a yawning gulf between the two men’s outlooks.
Both disagree sharply on the war’s causes, the shape of a possible compromise settlement and, especially, what kind of independent Ukrainian state – if any – might emerge from a deal. And that could result in the war continuing far longer than would square with Mr. Trump’s promises.
Diplomacy first?
One thing both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Mr. Trump’s people agree on is that a summit between the two leaders is desirable; talks about setting one up are reportedly underway. That’s more complicated than it sounds. There has been virtually no high-level or political dialogue between Moscow and Washington for about three years, so any preparations will have to start from scratch.
“A lot of advance work will have to go into it,” says Dmitry Suslov, a foreign policy expert with the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. “The contours of any possible deal will have to be elaborated through painstaking efforts by working groups at lower levels, and I wouldn’t underestimate how difficult that is going to be.”
Russian analysts say that the impetus from Washington to revive diplomacy represents a potential sea change. Mr. Putin recently welcomed the idea of talking with Mr. Trump “without preconditions,” other than a mutual desire to resolve issues through dialogue.
The new emphasis on negotiation “means that this yearslong effort to isolate Russia, to deal a strategic defeat to it, is over,” says Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser. He argues that a Trump-Putin summit should focus on restoring diplomatic engagement as much as possible, and leave the much thornier Ukraine settlement until later.
“The threat of U.S.-Russia war is the most serious danger right now, and that’s what needs to be taken off the table,” Mr. Markov says. “Once we have resumed dialogue, we may create conditions for further negotiations. The main thing now is to end this diplomatic war, which has made it virtually impossible to get anything done.”
A new, divided world order
The Russians have previous experience with Mr. Trump in the White House, which they remember as a time of crushed hopes and wasted efforts. Hence, expectations of his return seem subdued in the Russian media and commentariat.
Few in Moscow seem to take seriously Mr. Trump’s startling rhetoric about a possible U.S. annexation of Greenland, the Panama Canal, and maybe even Canada.
Media commentary tends to treat it as an implied vindication of Russia’s own claims of primacy in its former Soviet region. Some argue that Mr. Trump’s ambitions to strengthen the U.S. grip on its own hemisphere heralds a new, divided world order, in which great power blocs dominate their own areas and compete for global dominance.
“I don’t think this turn to the Monroe Doctrine and a more classical type of U.S. imperialism is just Trump’s idea. It’s an emerging mood,” says Mr. Suslov. “We are certainly looking at an intensification of the struggle for the Arctic,” while in the process shredding previously sacred ideas such as the sovereignty of smaller nations, he says.
As for Ukraine, recent statements by Mr. Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov make it clear that Russia is unlikely to accept any temporary ceasefire, even as a prelude to wider negotiations. In an interview with the official TASS news agency at the new year, Mr. Lavrov insisted that “what we need is reliable and legally binding agreements that would eliminate the root causes of the conflict and seal a mechanism precluding the possibility of their violation.”
With Russian forces grinding forward inexorably along the 1,000-mile front line, there seems little incentive for Moscow to stop until it gets what it wants.
Mr. Putin has frequently alluded to the abortive peace deal reached between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators back in April 2022 as a starting point for any future talks. That agreement would have required Ukrainian neutrality, substantial demilitarization, and the provision of cultural and linguistic rights for the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. At that time, Russia made no major territorial demands, and would even have left the issue of Crimea open.
What kind of Ukraine will emerge?
Now, Russia has already officially annexed the four regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia at a high price in blood (though the only region of those that they fully occupy is Luhansk). Analysts say it will require all those lands to be ceded to Russia under any peace agreement.
Territory is not Moscow’s primary concern, they add, but rather it is the orientation of the Ukrainian state that emerges from any settlement. “Russia accepts the existence of a sovereign, independent Ukraine,” says Mr. Markov. “We oppose a Ukraine that’s an anti-Russia Western client state.”
In addition to neutrality, Russian analysts argue, a new Ukraine will need to accept effective demilitarization and acquiesce to being part of a Russian sphere of influence. They say that would probably involve subservience in foreign policy, and openness to Russian capital flows, as well as cultural and political influences.
That is probably the biggest sticking point for the incoming Trump administration. While Mr. Trump has conceded in various statements that Ukraine may have to sacrifice territory and at least defer NATO membership, he does seem to agree with the idea of “armed neutrality” for a Ukraine that would be otherwise aligned with the West.
“I doubt that Trump has much capacity to make concessions,” says Mr. Suslov. “He does not want to appear weak. And we have already seen how he comes under pressure from all sides when he seems conciliatory toward Russia.”
Mr. Suslov says it’s likely that talks will begin while the fighting still rages, and probably a lot remains to be decided on the battlefield.
“At least we may see negotiations taking place, and that is good. But they will likely be tense and difficult, and most likely accompanied by escalation of war and sanctions. I do not see much reason to be optimistic.”
