Nuance in the fog: Plumbing for honesty in Russian opinion polls
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Fred Weir Special correspondent
| Moscow
If local opinion polls are to be believed, the overwhelming majority of Russians support the war in Ukraine and its architect, Vladimir Putin.
But are they to be believed?
Why We Wrote This
A story focused onWhat do Russians want? Sociologists struggle to make sense of responses to their opinion polls, knowing that opponents of the authoritarian government are reluctant to express themselves.
That’s what the Russian sociology community, inside and outside the country, is struggling to determine. Many say the polls cannot be taken at face value, and that pollsters need to use more sophisticated methods to give proper weight to government opponents, who might be afraid to express themselves.
A number of independent polling agencies are doing just that, asking nuanced follow-up questions to try to round out a more accurate picture of Russian society. Some of them have concluded that most Russians are simply depoliticized, trying not to think about current events.
Many citizens appear to have followed the path of what has become known as “internal emigration,” remaining physically in Russia, but mentally and politically absent.
The fact that their views are accessible is remarkable. “Russia is the only country in the world that still conducts independent polling while being a dictatorship,” says one Russian pollster. But, she adds, “in truth, we don’t really know how many people genuinely support Putin and the war.”
Thirteen months on, Russian polls continue to show very high levels of public support for both the war in Ukraine and its architect, Russian President Vladimir Putin. That poll data is routinely deployed by the Russian media to confirm the Kremlin narrative, and also seems to be widely accepted in the West.
But is it accurate?
That’s what Russia’s community of sociologists, both outside and inside the country, are struggling to determine.
Why We Wrote This
A story focused onWhat do Russians want? Sociologists struggle to make sense of responses to their opinion polls, knowing that opponents of the authoritarian government are reluctant to express themselves.
Recent surveys show 72% fully or partially “support the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine,” while a near all-time high of around 80% approve of the job Mr. Putin is doing. Few Russian sociologists, even those in exile or who identify as opposition-minded, are openly challenging these results, especially the findings of the independent Levada Center, which continues to operate despite being labeled a “foreign agent” by the Russian government.
But many argue that new tools and methodologies are needed to make sense of the data, due to the intense atmosphere of wartime Russia and growing state repression of people with differing views. Those methodologies include giving more prominence to respondents who seem reluctant to answer, and asking war supporters follow-up questions, such as whether they would prefer cuts to military or social spending, in order to test the depth of their conviction.
At root, they simply aren’t sure right now whether it is possible to conduct reliable public opinion polling, or even practice any kind of independent sociology, in wartime authoritarian Russia.
“Russia is the only country in the world that still conducts independent polling while being a dictatorship,” says Margarita Zavadskaya, a sociologist with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, who still keeps in close touch with her colleagues inside Russia.
“In this sense the Russian situation is quite unique. But there is no way we can compare these results with those we would get from similar surveys in electoral democracies. In truth, we don’t really know how many people genuinely support Putin and the war.”
Polling grows harder
Sociology is a relatively new discipline in Russia. It was banned in the USSR until 1956, because authorities believed that Marxism-Leninism made it unnecessary. The first generation of Soviet sociologists were largely marginalized, until the rise of the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who credited his sociologist wife, Raisa, with opening his eyes to the false picture of life in the USSR generated by Communist mythology and the urgent need for reform.
Sociology has since become a highly respected branch of Russian academia, and several polling agencies take constant social soundings on almost every conceivable topic. One of them, the Levada Center, accepts no state funding, and fiercely maintains its independence in the spirit of its legendary founder, Yury Levada.
But the agency’s budget has been slashed, the ecosystem of independent media outlets that formerly sustained it has shriveled as journalists left the country, and it has lost much of its access to official bodies and academic institutes.
Denis Volkov, the Levada Center’s current head, insists that the agency can still work, while recognizing the changed circumstances. People are still willing to answer pollsters’ questions in face-to-face interviews. But interviewing by phone has become problematic, because people are much more suspicious of unsolicited phone calls.
“Part of the population are people who support the military operation and follow events closely. They are ready to talk and express their point of view. For them, everything is OK,” he says. “People who do not support it are unwilling to talk, follow events less, withdraw into themselves.”
“So, yes, it’s become more difficult to work, and it’s a big question how long we can stay afloat under these conditions,” Mr. Volkov adds. “There is no direct pressure on us, but we don’t live in an airless space and we can’t say that our activity isn’t influenced by the surrounding circumstances. We’ll continue working for as long as possible.”
Finding nuance in the fog
A group of largely anonymous, independent experts has attempted to construct a more nuanced picture of how Russians regard the war, their political leaders, and their attitudes toward possible peace options for Russia. Their in-depth analysis, published online in a series called Chronicles, doesn’t contradict the findings of agencies like Levada, but purports to offer sharper and deeper texture.
For example, it finds that the “core” support for the war is just 22%, based on people who also say they would prioritize military spending and would not support any withdrawal of forces from Ukraine unless military goals were achieved. The study determined that “core” opposition was almost as great, at 20%, based on people who did not express support – often by choosing not to answer the question – and who also said social spending was more important than military, and who would back a peace settlement that wasn’t a full victory.
“Only a minority of Russians have a firm position,” says Alexei Miniailo, an opposition politician and co-founder of the Chronicles project. “I am pretty sure that the vast majority are in a depoliticized state. The Putin regime has been developing this passivity, devaluing politics for 20 years. Lots of people say they just don’t want to think about these issues. Of course, people in leadership positions say the same, but in their case it might be because they are afraid to answer.”
Most of the sociologists working with the Chronicles project don’t want to be publicly identified, fearing it might cause problems in their official workplaces, Mr. Miniailo says. But otherwise they have experienced few difficulties in carrying out their surveys.
“We had our website blocked by the government, but you can get around that with a [virtual private network]. Otherwise, no problems so far,” he says. “The recipe of the Putin regime is 1% repression, 99% fear. It means that everyone is in danger, but few actually get repressed. I am not saying it’s bearable, just that these are the conditions we work in.”
Physically present, mentally absent
There are even sociologists who offer more fringe interpretations of Russian polling, arguing that only the conformist part of the public will respond to polls, while the most politically critical people have switched off and followed the path of what has become known as “internal emigration,” remaining physically in Russia, but mentally and politically absent from the country.
Outside of the potentially incendiary field of public opinion polling, academic sociologists report virtually no changes in their situation.
“Academic sociology is pretty stable. So far none of our projects have been stalled or canceled,” says Mikhail Chernysh, an expert with the official Institute of Sociology. “I’m currently running a project on digital inequality, exploring new forms of inequality that are emerging from the growing digitalization of life. It’s a long-term study, and we’ve felt no pressures of any kind to change our focus, or pursue different approaches.”
Just about everyone agrees that it is possible to probe Russian public opinion, and nobody detects an opposition mood strong enough to make a political difference at this point. Perhaps the notion of “internal emigration” best describes the current mood of the most critical Russians – except that, unlike in Soviet times, it is quite possible to physically leave the country, and many professionals have already done so.
“The only prediction we can make about the future is that it will be turbulent,” says Mr. Miniailo.
