Trump’s pivot to Asia is a turn away from Europe
-
Ned Temko Columnist
| London
The full scale of Donald Trump’s ambition to remake U.S. foreign policy – and redefine America’s approach to the world – has become clearer in the past few days, with the rollout of his version of an Obama-era initiative dubbed the “pivot to Asia.”
It builds on one of the few remaining areas of bipartisan consensus in Washington – countering the rising economic clout, military strength, and geopolitical ambitions of China.
But Mr. Trump’s approach could hardly be more different than the shift begun under Mr. Obama and expanded by President Joe Biden.
Why We Wrote This
Donald Trump’s “pivot to Asia” is not a new concept, but it differs in key ways from President Barack Obama’s strategy. As he wages a tariff war in Asia, will Mr. Trump find the regional allies he needs?
President Trump’s bet is that it will also be more effective: a show of power that will ultimately allow for creative dealmaking with Chinese President Xi Jinping. It is designed to ensure, as Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told a major Asian security conference last Saturday, that “China will not invade Taiwan on his [Mr. Trump’s] watch.”
But he will have to reckon with two imponderables.
How will Mr. Xi respond? At least initially, China’s pushback on Mr. Hegseth’s address has been scalding.
And what of America’s Asian allies, described by Mr. Hegseth as key “force multipliers”?
They are feeling conflicted, confused, and unsettled about Mr. Trump’s America these days, and not only because of his sudden announcement in April of sweeping tariffs on their exports to the United States.
They are front-row spectators in Mr. Trump’s on-and-off tariff war with China, a key trading partner for many of them, and they are worried by the prospect of being caught in the middle of a major superpower showdown.
They have also been watching Mr. Trump loosen his commitment to the countries that had been America’s closest allies since World War II: the NATO member states of Europe.
It is from Europe that the contrast between Mr. Trump’s “pivot” and the Obama-era vision appears most stark.
When then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first set out the policy in a 2011 essay, she presented the pivot as building on, not downgrading, the transatlantic alliance.
But under Mr. Trump, it has begun to look like a pivot away from the European allies. The president has suggested that America’s security commitment to them could depend on whether he thinks that they have been spending enough on defense.
He has also prioritized ending the Ukraine war over heeding European allies’ warning that a peace deal should not reward Russian President Vladimir Putin for his 2022 invasion.
That view is shared by America’s major allies in Asia. They are concerned that such an outcome could embolden Mr. Xi to make good on his pledge to make the island democracy of Taiwan part of China, by force if necessary.
The encouraging news for the Trump administration is that Washington already has strong, and expanding, security partnerships with key Asian countries, including Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines and Taiwan.
The Biden administration also increased security cooperation with other major players, including India, and encouraged closer ties among regional partners.
They share America’s concerns about China’s growing power, and Beijing’s increasing readiness to brandish it, especially in disputed areas of the South China Sea.
And they view U.S. support as vital to their security.
So they will have welcomed Mr. Hegseth’s overall message – that the Indo-Pacific was now the American military’s “priority theater.”
Ditto his insistence that Mr. Trump did not seek conflict with China, but a “peace through strength” that would make the “costs too high” for Beijing to “dominate us – or our allies and partners.”
But they were left in no doubt that their terms of engagement with Washington, and of any new “peace” arrangement with Beijing, would be set by Mr. Trump.
“President Trump was elected to apply America First on the world stage,” Mr. Hegseth declared.
“We ask – and indeed insist – that our allies and partners do their part,” he added, telling them that they “can, and should, quickly upgrade their own defenses.”
Echoing what he called the administration’s “tough love” approach to NATO, he called on Asian allies to ratchet up their defense spending to 5% of GDP. That is clearly out of early realistic reach, even in those countries already increasing their military outlays.
South Korea, for example, facing a nuclear-armed North Korea, spends less than 3% of its GDP on defense.
Mr. Hegseth’s message had particular force because Mr. Trump has in the past openly questioned the cost of American military support for South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. He has also suggested Taiwan had “stolen” the role of preeminent producer of advanced microchips from U.S. companies.
Still, Washington’s Asian allies can hope that strongly shared security interests, and Mr. Trump’s determination to achieve “peace through strength” with China, will shield them from the kind of tensions shaking the transatlantic partnership.
On the other hand, amid Mr. Hegseth’s praise for his boss’s guiding worldview – that “America does not have or seek permanent enemies” – NATO’s experience has left some of them wondering whether, under Mr. Trump, America can be relied on as a permanent friend.
