Why Xi’s fixation on loyalty could be perilous for China

A huge set of gold doors swings open, an announcer heralds the “newly elected General Secretary,” and Xi Jinping strides, smiling and waving, onto the red-carpeted stage in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, confirming his rare third term at the helm of China’s ruling Communist Party.

Clapping and following Mr. Xi is the newly promoted Li Qiang, whose expected installation in March as China’s next premier is all but confirmed by his place next to Mr. Xi as the No. 2 member of the party’s seven-man Politburo Standing Committee.

At Sunday’s press event unveiling China’s new leadership lineup, the rise of Mr. Li was telling. As the Party Secretary of Shanghai, Mr. Li oversaw a draconian and unpopular lockdown of the city’s 25 million people during a major COVID-19 outbreak last spring, triggering protests and even calls for his dismissal. But Mr. Li stuck with the strict zero-COVID-19 strategy mandated by Mr. Xi, and his loyalty and close ties with Mr. Xi secured his promotion.

“The lockdown ... was a disaster for the residents of Shanghai, but ... it signaled Li was willing to put loyalty to Xi above everything else,” says Neil Thomas, senior analyst for China and Northeast Asia at the Eurasia Group think tank. 

Indeed, unwavering fealty and tight connections with Mr. Xi have emerged as the main criteria for rising to the top in China today. Three of the newly promoted Politburo Standing Committee members, Mr. Li, Cai Qi, and Ding Xuexiang, have all served alongside Mr. Xi as his secretaries. All fit the mold of “yes men” rather than independent-minded officials willing to push back, experts say.

“They are all quite familiar to you,” Mr. Xi told the press as he introduced his new lineup – a familiarity that runs far deeper between the men and Mr. Xi himself.

“These are not just people who have worked with Xi Jinping. These are people who are deeply trusted by Xi Jinping,” says Victor Shih, an expert on the elite politics of China as examined in his recent book, “Coalitions of the Weak.”

Ng Han Guan/AP

New members of the Politburo Standing Committee, from left, Li Xi, Cai Qi, Zhao Leji, President Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, Wang Huning, and Ding Xuexiang are introduced at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Oct. 23, 2022. Two key members of the main competing faction – Premier Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, head of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference – were both retired from the Politburo Standing Committee, although based on their ages they could have served an additional five-year term.

New extremes

Overall, the leadership overhaul at the just-concluded 20th Party Congress and related meetings marks a new extreme in Mr. Xi’s imposition of personalized, strongman rule together with his dismantling of the institutional norms and collective leadership built over 30 years by his post-Mao Zedong predecessors, experts say.

“What we see here is the collective leadership form that Deng Xiaoping tried to establish in China after Mao died – Xi has pretty much completely destroyed and replaced it with a personalistic leadership system,” says Susan Shirk, a research professor and chair of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego.

In concentrating power in his own hands, Mr. Xi has jettisoned age limits for himself and proteges, while prematurely retiring members of rival factions, experts say.

Amid the recent wave of promotions, for example, key members of the main competing faction – made of officials affiliated with the Communist Youth League and represented by Mr. Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao – were left out. Premier Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, head of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, were both retired from the Politburo Standing Committee, although based on their ages they could have served an additional five-year term. Vice Premier Hu Chunhua, well under retirement age, was not selected to remain on the Politburo.

Mr. Hu Jintao’s abrupt, escorted departure from the closing ceremony of the congress on Saturday – caught on camera and officially attributed to issues with the ex-leader’s health – also sparked speculation that his removal was part of a calculated effort to limit the influence of past leaders who may disagree with Mr. Xi.

One reason for Mr. Xi’s drive to surround himself with officials who will carry out his orders without question, experts say, is his view that China faces looming outside threats and must show unity in an emergency such as a financial crisis or war.

Indeed, at Sunday’s press conference, Mr. Xi raised such concerns, vowing that “we will not be daunted by high winds, choppy waters, or even dangerous storms.”

“For Xi Jinping ... having absolute compliance for his orders is very important now,” says Dr. Shih, associate professor of political economy at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy.

Andy Wong/AP

Chinese President Xi Jinping waves at an event to introduce new members of the Politburo Standing Committee at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Oct. 23, 2022. One reason for Mr. Xi’s drive to surround himself with loyalists, experts say, is his view that China must show unity in the face of looming outside threats.

Smooth sailing, or courting instability?

To be sure, China has chalked up significant accomplishments under Mr. Xi, including reducing corruption, alleviating poverty, keeping COVID-19 deaths far lower than in other countries, and maintaining steady, if slowing, economic growth. He retains broad popularity, especially among China’s nationalists.

Yet Mr. Xi’s top-down style also creates risks of its own, making policy course corrections difficult and even potentially keeping Mr. Xi uninformed if his underlings – rewarded for adhering to his line – are reluctant or afraid to raise contrary opinions or share bad news lest they risk being ousted.

For example, Mr. Xi’s ongoing COVID-19 restrictions are causing regular lockdowns in cities across China and resulting in economic damage, even as they keep cases and deaths low.

Difficult, structural reforms vital to the long-term health of China’s economy may also be less likely under Mr. Xi, experts say.

“The overall policy mix Xi is pursuing is taking China further away from the right type of reforms that would actually solve its deep-seated problems,” says Mr. Thomas. “Xi having more allies at the top helps him do more of what he wants, but what he wants to do is not what’s best for solving China’s problems.”

A related risk is that of political instability in the longer term, experts say, as Mr. Xi’s dominance could lead to opposition from frustrated elites, especially if public dissatisfaction grows with a slowing economy and Mr. Xi’s tighter Party controls over society and business.

“There’s an impression zero-COVID has really undercut public support for Xi Jinping in cities, and if that’s the case, the risk of splits in the leadership is greater,” says Dr. Shirk, author of “Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise.”

Mr. Xi’s ultimate succession is also a concern. As he has secured a path to lifelong rule, he has given no clear indication that he has designated a successor.

“The risk of a disorderly succession is one of the most underappreciated political risks in China under Xi’s rule, because these norms of succession have been decisively broken,” says Mr. Thomas.